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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
HURLEY ET AL. a IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, 
LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON ET 
AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OP 
MASSACHUSETTS 
No. 94-749. Argued April 25, 1995—Decided June 19,1995 
Petitioner South Boston Allied War Veteran Council, tn unincorporat-
ed association of individuals elected from various veterans groups, 
was authorised by the city of Boston to organize and conduct the St 
Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade. The Council refuted a place 
in the 1993 event to respondent GLIB, an organisation formed for 
the purpose of marching in the parade in order to express its 
members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual individuals, to show that there are such individuals in the 
community, and to support the like men and woman who sought to 
march in the New York St Patrick's Day parade. GLIB and some 
of its members filed this suit in state court alleging that the denial 
of their application to inarch violated* inter alia, a state law prohib-
iting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in places of 
public accommodation. In fi^flmg such a violation and ordering the 
Council to i-nrhiH* nTTB in the parade, the trial court, ftmntig other 
things, concluded *hffr $j& parade "h*& theme other than 
the involvement of the participants, and that, given the Council's 
lack of selectivity in choosing parade participants and its failure to 
circumscribe the marchers' messages, the parade lacked any expres-
sive purpose, such that GLIB's inclusion therein would not violate 
the CounriTi First Amendment right*. The Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts affirmed, 
E*ld: The state courts' application of the Massachusetts public 
accommodations law to require private citizens who organize a 
parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a message 
that the organizers do not wish to convey violate! the First Amend* 
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D HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, GROUP OF BOSTON 
Syllabus 
mant Pp. 8-24, 
(a) Confronted with the state courts' conclusion that the factual 
characteristics of petitioners9 activity place it within the realm of 
non-expressive conduct this Court has a constitutional duty to 
conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole, 
without deference to those courts, to assure that their judgment 
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion. See, *.f ., New York Tlmts CO. V. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 2£5. 
Pp. 8-10. 
(b) The selection of contingents to make a parade ie entitled to 
First Amendment protection. Parades such as petitioners' are a 
form of protected expression because they include marchers who are 
making eorne sort of collective paint, not just to each other but to 
bystanders along the way. Cf, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago* 394 U. 5. 
I l l , U2, Moreover, such protection is not limited to a parade's 
banners and songs, but extends to symbolic acts. See, *./., West 
Virginia B<L of Ed. v. BanutU, 319 U, S. 624, 632, 642. Although 
the Council has been rather lenient in admitting participants to its 
parade, a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection 
simply by f?n^ n)MT^ n^g^  multifarious voices, by ff^^g to edit their 
themes to isolate a specific message as the exclusive subject matter 
of the speech, or by failing to generate, as an original matter, each 
item featured in the communication. Thus, petitioners are entitled 
to protection under the First Amendment. GUB's participation as 
a unit in the parade was equally expressive, since the organization 
was formed to celebrate its members' sexual identities and for 
related purposes. Pp. 10-13. 
<c) The Massachusetts law does not, as a general mnttr, violate 
the First or Fourteenth Amendments, Its provisions are well within 
a legislature's power to enact when it has reason to believe that a 
given group is being discriminated against And the statute does 
not, on its lace, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its 
content. Pp. 13-14. 
(d) The state court's application, however, had the effect of 
declaring the sponsors4 speech itself to be the public accominodalion 
Since every participating parade unit affects the message conveyed 
by the private organizers, the state courts' peculiar application of 
the Massachusetts law essentially forced the Council to alter the 
parade's expressive content and thereby violated the fundamental 
First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose 
the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not 
to say Petitioners' claim to the benefit of this principle is sound, 
since the Council selects the expressive units cf the parade from 
potential participants and clearly dedded to exclude a message it 
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Syllabus 
did not like from the communication it chose to make, and that is 
enough to invoke its light as a private speaker to shape its expres-
sion by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another, 
free from state interference. The constitutional violation is not 
saved by Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U, 8. __ . 
The Council is a speaker in its own right; a parade does not consist 
of individual, unrelated segments that happen to be transmitted 
together for individual selection by members of the audience; and 
there is no assertion here that some speakers will be destroyed in 
the absence of the Massachusetts law. Nor has any other lagidmate 
interest been identified in support of applying that law in the way 
done by the state courts to expressive activity like the parade. 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 87, and New 
York State Club AWL, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U. S. 1, 18, 
distinguished. Pp. 14-23. 
418 Mass. 233, 636 N. £. 2d 1292, reversed and remanded. 
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 94-749 
JOHN J. HURLEY AND SOUTH BOSTON ALLIED 
WAR VETERANS COUNCIL, PETITIONERS 
v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN 
AND BISEXUAL GROUP OF 
BOSTON, ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL 
COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
[June 19, 1395] 
JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court 
The issue in this ease is whether Massachusetts may 
require private citizens who organize a parade to include 
among the marchers a group imparting a message the 
organizers do not wish to convey. We hold that such a 
mandate violates the First Amendment 
I 
March 17 is set aside for two celebrations in South 
Boston. As early as 1737, some people in Boston 
observed the feast of the apostle to Ireland, and since 
1776 the day has marked the evacuation of royal troops 
and Loyalists from the city, prompted by the guns 
captured at Ticonderoga and set up on Dorchester 
Heights under General Washington's command. Wash-
ington himself reportedly drew on the earlier tradition 
in choosing a 8t Patrick* as the response to •Boston," the 
password used in the colonial lines on evacuation day. 
See J. Crimmins, St. Patrick's Day: Its Celebration in 
New York and other American Places, 1737-1845, pp. 
15, 19 (1902); see generally 1 H.S. Commager & R. 
Morris, The Spirit of 'Seventy Six 138-183 (1958); The 
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2 HURLEY p. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY GROUP OF BOSTON 
American Book of Days 262-265 (J. Hatch edM 3d ed. 
1978). Although the General Court of Massachusetts did 
not officially designate March 17 as Evacuation Day 
until 1938, see Mass, Gen. Laws §6:12K 11992), the City 
Council of Boston had previously sponsored public 
celebrations of Evacuation Day, including notable 
commemorations on the centennial in 1876, and on the 
125th anniversary in 1901, with its parade, salute, 
concert, and fireworks display. See Celebration of the 
Centennial Anniversary of the Evacuation of Boston by 
the British Army (G. Ellis ed. 1876); Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v City of 
Boston et a/., Civ, Action No. 92-1516 (Super. Ct, Mass., 
Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in App. to Pet for Cert. Bl, 
B8-B9. 
The tradition of formal sponsorship by the city came 
to an end in 1947, however, when Mayor James Michael 
Curley himself granted authority to organize and 
conduct the St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade to 
the petitioner South Boston Allied War Veterans Coun-
cil, an unincorporated association of individuals elected 
from various South Boston veterans groups. Every year 
since that time, the Council has applied for and received 
a permit for the parade, which at times has included as 
many as 20,000 marchers and drawn up to 1 million 
watchers. No other applicant has ever applied for that 
permit Id, at B9. Through 1992, the city allowed the 
Council to use the city's official seal, and provided 
printing services as well as direct funding. 
1992 was the year that a number of gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants joined 
together with other supporters to form the respondent 
organization, GLIB, to march in the parade as a way to 
express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual individuals, to demonstrate that 
there are such men and women among those so descended, 
and to express their solidarity with like individuals 
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who sought to march in New York's St Patrick's Day 
Parade. Id.f at B3; App. 51, Although the Council 
denied GLIB's application to take part in the 1992 
parade, GLIB obtained a state-court order to include its 
contingent, which marched "uneventfully" among that 
year's 10,000 participants and 750,000 spectators. App. 
to Pet. for Cert. B3, and n. 4, 
In 1993, after the Council had again reftised to admit 
GLIB to the upcoming parade, the organization and 
some of its members filed this suit against the Council, 
the individual petitioner John J. "Wacko" Hurley, and 
the City of Boston, alleging violations of the State and 
Federal Constitutions and of the state public accommo-
dations law, which prohibits "any distinction, discrimina* 
tion or restriction on account of . . . sexual orientation 
• • • relative to the admission of any person to, or 
treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort 
or amusement19 Mass. Gen. Laws §272:98. After 
finding that M[f]or at least the past 47 years, the Parade 
has traveled the same basic route along the public 
streets of South Boston, providing entertainment, 
amusement, and recreation to participants and specta-
tors alike/ App* to Pet. for Cert- B5-B6, the state trial 
court ruled that the parade fell within the statutory 
definition of a public accommodation, which includes 
"any place . . . which is open to and accepts or solicits 
the patronage of the general public and, without limiting 
the generality of this definition, whether or not it be 
. • . (6) a boardwalk or other public highway [or] . . . (8) 
a place of public amusement, recreation, sport, exercise 
or entertainment,* Mass. Gen. Laws §272:92A. The 
court found that the Council had no written criteria and 
employed no particular procedures far admission, voted 
on new applications in batches, had occasionally admit* 
ted groups who simply showed up at the parade without 
having submitted an application, and did "not generally 
inquire into the specific messages or views of each 
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applicant- App. to Pet, for Cert. B8-B9. The court 
consequently rejected the Council's contention that the 
parade was "private* (in the sense of being exclusive), 
holding instead that *the lack of genuine selectivity in 
choosing participants and sponsors demonstrates that 
the Parade is a public event" Id., at B6. It found the 
parade to be •eclectic," containing a wide variety of 
"patriotic, commercial, political, moral, artistic, religious, 
athletic, public service, trade union, and eleemosynary 
themes," as well as conflicting messages, Id, at B24. 
While noting that the Council had indeed excluded the 
Ku Klux Klan and ROAR (an antibusing group), idL, at 
B7, it attributed little significance to these facts, 
concluding ultimately that *[t]he only common theme 
among the participants and sponsors is their public 
involvement in the Parade," id., at B24. 
The court rejected the Council's assertion that the 
exclusion of "groups with sexual themes merely formal-
ized [the fact] that the Parade expresses traditional 
religious and social values," id*, at B3, and found the 
Council's "final position [to be] that GLIB would be 
excluded because of its values and its message, Le.y its 
members* sexual orientation," id., at B4, n. 5, citing Tr. 
of Closing Arg. 43, 51-52 (Nov. 23, 1998), This position, 
in the court's view, was not only violative of the public 
accommodations law but "paradoxical" as well, since "a 
proper celebration of St Patrick's and Evacuation Day 
requires diversity and inclusiveness." App, to Pet. for 
Cert. B24. The court rejected the notion that OUB's 
admission would trample on the Council's First Amend-
ment rights since the court understood that constitutional 
protection of any interest in expressive association 
would "requirfe] focus on a specific message, theme, or 
group0 absent from the parade. Ibid. "Given the 
[Council's] lack of selectivity in choosing participants and 
failure to circumscribe the marchers' message," the court 
found it "impossible to discern any specific expressive 
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purpose entitling the Parade to protection under the 
First Amendment." Id., at B25. It concluded that the 
parade is "not an exercise of [the Council's] constitution-
ally protected right of expressive association,9 but 
instead "an open recreational event that is subject to the 
public accommodations law.1* Id, at B27. 
The court held that because the statute did not 
mandate inclusion of GLIB but only prohibited discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation, any infringement on 
the Council's right to expressive association was only 
"incidental" and "no greater than necessary to accom-
plish the statute's legitimate purpose" of eradicating 
discrimination. Id., at B25, citing Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 628-629 (1984)- Accord-
ingly, it ruled that 'GLIB is entitled to participate in 
the Parade on the same terms and conditions as other 
participants." Id, at B27.1 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts af-
firmed, seeing nothing clearly erroneous in the trial 
judge's findings that GLIB was excluded from the parade 
based on the sexual orientation of its members, that it 
was impossible to detect an expressive purpose in the 
parade, that there was no state action, and that the 
parade was a public accommodation within the meaning 
of §272:92A- Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston v. Boston, 416 Mass. 238, 242-248, 636 
1Tha court dismissed the public accommodations law claim against 
the city because it found that the city's actions did not amount to 
inciting or assisting in the Council's violations of $272:98. App. to 
Pet. for Cert. B12-B13. It also dismissed respondents' First and 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge against tha Council for want of 
state action triggering tha proscriptions of those Amendments. Id, 
at B14-B22. finally, the court did not reach the state constitu-
tional questions, since respondents had apparently assumed in their 
arguments that those claims, too, depended for their success upon a 
finding of state action and because of the court's holding that the 
public accommodation statutes apply to the parade. I£ # at B22L 
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N. E- 2d 1293, 1295-1298 (1994).2 Turning to peti-
tioners9 First Amendment claim that application of the 
public accommodations law to the parade violated their 
freedom of speech (as distinguished from their right to 
expressive association, raised in the trial court), the 
court's majority held that it need not decide on the 
particular First Amendment theory involved "because, as 
the [trial] judge found, it is 'impossible to discern any 
specific expressive purpose entitling the parade to 
protection under the First Amendment/11 Id, at 249, 
636 N. E. 2d, at 1299 (footnote omitted). The defend-
ants had thus failed at the trial level "to demonstrate 
that the parade truly was an exercise of . . . First 
Amendment ri^its,* id., at 250, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1299, 
citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U. S. 288, 293, n. 5 (1984), and on appeal nothing 
indicated to the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court 
that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence on this 
point was clearly erroneous, ibid. The court rejected 
petitioners' further challenge to the law as overbroad, 
holding that it does not, on its face, regulate speech, 
does not let public officials examine the content of 
speech, and would not be interpreted as reaching speech. 
Id., at 251-252, 636 N. E, 2d, at 1800. Finally, the 
court rq'ected the challenge that the public accom-
modations law was unconstitutionally vague, holding 
that this case did not present an issue of speech and 
that the law gave persons of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what was prohibited. 
Id., at 252, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1300-1301. 
Justice Nolan dissented. In his view, the Council 
udoes not need a narrow or distinct theme or message in 
its parade for it to be protected under the First Amend-
* Since respondents did not cross-appeal the dismissal of their 
claims against the city, the Supreme Judicial Court declined to 
reach those claim*. 418 Mast., at 245, n 12, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1297. 
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ment/ Id., at 256, 686 N. E. 2d, at 1303. First, he 
wrote, even if the parade had no message at all, GLIB's 
particular message could not be forced upon it. Id, at 
257, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1303, citing Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U. S- 705, 717 (1977) (state requirement to display 
"Live Free or Die" on license plates violates First 
Amendment). Second, according to Justice Nolan, the 
trial judge clearly erred in finding the parade devoid of 
expressive purpose. Ibid. He would have held that the 
Council, like any expressive association, cannot he 
barred from excluding applicants who do not share the 
views the Council wishes to advance. Id., at 257-259, 
636 N. E. 2d, at 1303-1304, citing Roberts v. United 
States Jaycee$> 468 U- S. 609 (1984). Under either a 
pure speech or associational theory, the State's purpose 
of eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, according to the dissent, could be achieved 
by more narrowly drawn means, such as ordering 
admission of individuals regardless of sexual preference, 
without taking the further step of prohibiting the 
Council from editing the views expressed in their 
parade. Id., at 256, 258, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1302, 1304, 
In Justice Nolan's opinion, because GLIB's message was 
separable from the status of its members, such a 
narrower order would accommodate the State's interest 
without the likelihood of infringing on the Council's 
First Amendment rights. Finally, he found clear error 
in the trial judge's equation of exclusion on the basis of 
GLIB's message with exclusion on the basis of its 
members' sexual orientation* lb the dissent this 
appeared false in the light of "overwhelming evidence" 
that the Council objected to GLIB on account of its 
message and a dearth of testimony or documentation 
indicating that sexual orientation was the bar to 
admission. 7d, at 260, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1304. The 
dissent accordingly concluded that the Council had not 
even violated the State's public accommodations law. 
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We granted certiorari to determine whether the 
requirement to admit a parade contingent expressing a 
message not of the private organizers' own choosing 
violates the First Amendment 513 U. S« (1995). 
We hold that it does and reverse. 
II 
Given the scope of the issues as originally joined in 
this case, it is worth noting some that have fallen aside 
in the course of the litigation, before reaching us. Al-
though the Council presents us with a First Amendment 
claim, respondents do not Neither do they press a 
claim that the Council's action has denied them equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. While the guarantees of free speech and 
equal protection guard only against encroachment by the 
government and Merec[t] no shield against merely private 
conduct," Shelley v. Kroerner, 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948); see 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 513 (1976), respond-
ents originally argued that the Council's conduct was not 
purely private, but had the character of state action. 
The trial court's review of the city's involvement led it 
to find otherwise, however, and although the Supreme 
Judicial Court did not squarely addre&s the issue, it 
appears to have affirmed the trial court's decision on 
that point as well as the others. In any event, respond-
ents have not brought that question up either in a cross* 
petition for certiorari or in their briefs filed in this 
Court. When asked at oral argument whether they 
challenged the conclusion by the Massachusetts' courts 
that no state action is involved in the parade, respond-
ents' counsel answered that they "do not press that issue 
here." Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. In this Court, then, their 
claim for inclusion in the parade rests solely on the 
Massachusetts public accommodations law. 
There is no corresponding concession from the other 
aide, however, and certainly not to the state courts' 
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characterization of the parade as lacking the element of 
expression for purposes of the First Amendment. 
Accordingly, our review of petitioners' claim that their 
activity is indeed in the nature of protected speech 
carries with it a constitutional duty to conduct an 
independent examination of the record as a whole, 
without deference to the trial court. See Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S- 485, 
499 (1984). The "requirement of independent appellate 
review * . . is a rule of federal constitutional law/ id, 
at 510, which does not limit our deference to a trial 
court on matters of witness credibility, Harte-Hanks 
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U. S. 657, 
688 (1989), but which generally requires us to ^review 
the finflvng of facts by a State court • . . where a 
conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of 
fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in 
order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the 
facts," Fieke v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385-386 (1927). 
See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 840 U, S. 268, 271 
(1951); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 189 (1964) 
(opinion of Brennan, J.). This obligation rests upon us 
simply because the reaches of the First Amendment are 
ultimately defined by the facte it is held to embrace, and 
we must thus decide for ourselves whether a given 
course of conduct falls on the near or far side of the line 
of constitutional protection. See Bose Corp., supra, at 
503. Even where a speech case has originally been tried 
in a federal court, subject to the provision of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) that "[f]inding8 of fact. . . 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous," we are 
obliged to make a fresh examination of crucial facts. 
Hence, in this case, though we are confronted with the 
state courts* conclusion that the factual characteristics 
of petitioners' activity place it within the vast realm of 
non-expressive conduct, our obligation is to "'make an 
independent examination of the whole record/ . . . so as 
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to assure ourselves that th[is] judgment does not 
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression." New York Times Co. v« Sullivan, 376 U. S. 
254, 285 (1964) (footnote omitted), quoting Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963). 
m 
A 
If there were no reason for a group of people to march 
from here to there except to reach a destination, they 
could make the trip without expressing any message 
beyond the fact of the march itself. Some people might 
call such a procession a parade, but it would not be 
much of one. Real "[plarades are public dramas of 
social relations, and in them performers define who can 
be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are 
available for communication and consideration." S. 
Davis, Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-
Century Philadelphia 6 (1986). Hence, we use the word 
"parade" to indicate marchers who are making some sort 
of collective point, not just to each other but to bystand-
ers along the way. Indeed a parade's dependence on 
watchers is so extreme that nowadays, as with Bishop 
Berkeley's celebrated tree, *if a parade or demonstration 
receives no media coverage, it may as well not have 
happened.11 Id., at 171. Parades are thus a form of 
expression, not just motion, and the inherent expressive-
ness of marching to make a point explains our cases 
involving protest marches. In Gregory v, Chicago, 394 
U* S. Ill, 112 (1969), for example, petitioners had taken 
part in a procession to express their grievances to the 
city government, and we held that such a "march, if 
peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere of 
conduct protected by the First Amendment." Similarly, 
in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 
(1963), where petitioners had joined in a march of 
protest and pride, carrying placards and singing The 
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Star Spangled Banner, we held that the activities 
"reflect an exercise of these basic constitutional rights in 
their most pristine and classic form.* Accord, 
Shuttleeworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 152 (1969). 
The protected expression that inheres in a parade is 
not limited to its banners and songs, however, for the 
Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as 
mediums of expression. Noting that 'Mymbolism is a 
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas," 
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 632 
(1943), our cases have recognized that the First Amend-
ment shields such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing 
to do so), id., at 632, 642, wearing an arm band to 
protest a war, Tinker v, Des Moines Independent Com* 
munity School Diet, 393 U. S. 503, 505-506 (1969), 
displaying a red flag, Strornberg v. Californiat 283 U. S. 
359, 369 (1931), and even "[mlarching, walking or 
parading" in uniforms displaying the swastika, National 
Socialist Party of America v. Skokie9 432 U. S. 43 (1977), 
As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
^particularized message,* cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 
U. S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam) > would never reach 
the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, 
music of Arnold Sch&nberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll. 
Not many marches, then, are beyond the realm of 
expressive parades, and the South Boston celebration is 
not one of them. Spectators line the streets; people 
march in costumes and uniforms, carrying flags and 
banners with all sorts of messages (e.g.y "England get 
out of Ireland," "Say no to drugs*); marching bands and 
pipers play, floats are pulled along, and the whole show 
is broadcast over Boston television. See Record, Exh. 84 
(video), lb be sure! we agree with the state courts that 
in spite of excluding some applicants, the Council is 
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rather lenient in admitting participants. But a private 
speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply 
by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit 
their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclu-
sive subject matter of the speech. Nor, under our 
precedentt does First Amendment protection require a 
speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item 
featured in the communication. Cable operators, for 
example, are engaged in protected speech activities even 
when they only select programming originally produced 
by others. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v, FCC, 
512 U. 8. , (1994) (slip op., at 11) (-Cable 
programmers and cable operators engage in and trans-
mit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the 
speech and press provisions of the First Amendment"). 
For that matter, the presentation of an edited compila-
tion of speech generated by other persons is a staple of 
most newspapers9 opinion pages, which, of course, fall 
squarely within the core of First Amendment security, 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. TornUlo, 418 U. S. 241, 
258 (1974), as does even the simple selection of a paid 
noncommercial advertisement for inclusion in a daily 
paper, see New York Times, 376 U, S., at 265-266. The 
selection of contingents to make a parade is entitled to 
similar protection. 
Respondents1 participation as a unit in the parade was 
equally expressive. GLIB was formed for the very 
purpose of marching in it, as the trial court found, in 
order to celebrate its members9 identity as openly gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immi-
grants, to show that there are such individuals in the 
community, and to support the like men and women who 
sought to march in the New York parade. App. to Pet. 
for Cert BS. The organization distributed a fact sheet 
describing the members' intentions, App. A51, and the 
record otherwise corroborates the expressive nature of 
GUB's participation, see Record, Exh. 84; App. A67 
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(photograph). In 1993, members of GLIB marched 
behind a shamrock-strewn banner with the simple 
inscription "Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston/ GLIB understandably seeks to 
communicate its ideas as part of the existing parade, 
rather than staging one of its own. 
B 
The Massachusetts public accommodations law under 
which respondent* brought suit has a venerable history. 
At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who 
"made profession of a public employment," were prohib-
ited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a 
customer. Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 484-485, 88 
Ens- Rep. 1458, 1464-1465 (KB. 1701) (Holt, C. J.); see 
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. 8. 226, 298, n. 17 (1964) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 
U. S. 267, 277 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). As one 
of the 19th century English judges put it, the rule was 
that a[t]he innkeeper is not to select his guests!;] [hie 
has no right to say to one, you shall come into my inn, 
and to another you shall not, as every one coming and 
conducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be 
received; and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of 
public servants.* Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213, 219, 
173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96 (N.P. 1835); 11 Konvitz & T. 
Leskes, A Century of Civil Rights 160 (1961). 
After the Civil War, the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts was the first State to codify this principle to 
ensure access to public accommodations regardless of 
race. See Act Forbidding Unjust Discrimination on 
Account of Color or Race, 1865 Mass. Acts, ch. 277 (May 
16, 1865); Konvitz & Leskes, supra, at 155-56; L.G. 
Lerman & A Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to 
Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public 
Accommodations Laws, 7 N. Y. U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 215, 238 (1978); F* Fox, Discrimination and 
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Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law, 44 B. XJ. L. 
Rev. 30, 58 (1964). In prohibiting discrimination "in any 
licensed inn, in any public place of amusement, public 
conveyance or public meeting," 1865 Mass. Acts, ch. 277, 
§1, the original statute already expanded upon the 
common law, which had not conferred any right of 
access to places of public amusement, Lennan & Ander-
son, supra, at 248. As with many public accommoda-
tions statutes across the Nation, the legislature contin-
ued to broaden the scope of legislation, to the point that 
the law today prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
"race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual 
orientation . . ., deafness, blindness or any physical or 
mental disability or ancestry* in "the admission of any 
person to, or treatment in any place of public accommo-
dation, resort or amusement" Mass. Gen. Laws §272:98. 
Provisions like these are well within the State's usual 
power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe 
that a given group is the target of discrimination, and 
they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or 
Fourteenth Amendments- See, e.g,, New York State Club 
Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U. S. 1, 11-16 
(1988); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 XT. S. 609, 
624-626 (1984); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 879 XJ. 3. 241, 258-262 (1964). Nor is this 
statute unusual in any obvious way, since it does not, on 
its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its 
content, the focal point of its prohibition being rather on 
the act of discriminating against individuals in the 
provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and 
services on the proscribed grounds. 
C 
In the case before us, however, the Massachusetts law 
has been applied in a peculiar way. Its enforcement 
does not address any dispute about the participation of 
openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various 
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units admitted to the parade. The petitioners disclaim 
any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no 
individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded 
from parading as a member of any group that the 
Council has approved to march. Instead, the disagree-
ment goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade 
unit carrying its own banner. See App, to Pet. for Cert* 
B26-B27, and n. 28. Since every participating unit 
affects the message conveyed by the private organizers* 
the state courts' application of the statute produced an 
order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the 
expressive content of their parade. Although the state 
courts spoke of the parade as a place of public accommo-
dation, see. &£., 418 Mass., at 247-248, 636 N. E. 2d, at 
1297-1298, once the expressive character of both the 
parade and the marching GLIB contingent is understood, 
it becomes apparent that the state courts' application of 
the statute had the effect of declaring the sponsors1 
speech itself to be the public accommodation. Under 
this approach any contingent of protected individuals 
with a message would have the right to participate in 
petitioners* speech, so that the communication produced 
by the private organizers would be shaped by all those 
protected by the law who wished to join in with some 
expressive demonstration of their own. But this use of 
the State's power violates the fundamental rule of 
protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker 
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own 
message. 
"Since all speech inherently involves choices of what 
to say and what to leave unsaid,* Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Col., 475 U, S. 1, 11 
(1986) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original), one 
important manifestation of the principle of free speech 
is that one who chooses to speak may also decide "what 
not to say/ id., at 16. Although the State may at times 
"prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial adver-
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tising" by requiring the dissemination of "purely factual 
and uncontroversial information,* Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
IL S. 626, 651 (1985); see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 
386-387 (1973), outside that context it may not compel 
affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees, 
see Bamette, 319 U. S., at 642, Indeed this general 
rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, 
applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or 
endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the 
speaker would rather avoid, Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm'n, 514 U. S. , (1995) (slip op., at 6-7); 
Riley v. National Federation of Blind of NC., Inc., 487 
U. S. 781, 797-798 (1988), subject, perhaps, to the 
permissive law of defamation, New York Times, 376 
U. S, 254; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 
347-349 (1974); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U. S. 46 (1988). Nor is the rule's benefit restricted to 
the press, being enjoyed by business corporations 
generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisti-
cated expression as well as by professional publishers. 
Its point is simply the point of all speech protection, 
which is to shield just those choices of content that in 
someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful. See 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U« S. 444 (1969); Terminiello 
v Chicago. 337 U. S. 1 (1949). 
Petitioners1 claim to the benefit of this principle of 
autonomy to control one's own speech is as sound as the 
South Boston parade is expressive. Rather like a 
composer, the Council selects the expressive units of the 
parade from potential participants, and though the score 
may aot produce a particularized message, each contin-
gents expression in the Council's eyes comports with 
what merits celebration on that day. Even if this view 
gives the Council credit for a more considered judgment 
than it actively made, the Council clearly decided to 
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exclude a message it did not like from the communica-
tion it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its 
right as a private speaker to shape its expression by 
speaking on one subject while remaining silent on 
another. The message it disfavored is Dot difficult to 
identify. Although GLIB's point (like the Council's) is 
not wholly articulate, a contingent marching behind the 
organization's banner would at least bear witness to the 
fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and 
the presence of the organised marchers would suggest 
their view that people of their sexual orientations have 
as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as 
heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units 
organized around other identifying characteristics. The 
parade's organizers may not believe these facts about 
Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object to unquali-
fied social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some 
other reason for wishing to keep GLIB's message out of 
the parade* But whatever the reason, it boils down to 
the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular 
point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond 
the government's power to control 
Respondents argue that any tension between this rule 
and the Massachusetts law falls short of unconstitution-
ality, citing the most recent of our cases on the general 
subject of compelled access for expressive purposes, 
Turner Broadcasting, 512 U. S. . There we reviewed 
regulations requiring cable operators to set aside 
channels for designated broadcast signals, and applied 
only intermediate scrutiny. 1<L, at (slip op., at 88). 
Respondents contend on this authority that admission of 
GLEB to the parade would not threaten the core princi-
ple of speaker's autonomy because the Council, like a 
cable operator, is merely "a conduit" for the speech of 
participants in the parade "rather than itself a speaker." 
Brief for Respondent 21* But this metaphor is not apt 
here, because GLIB's participation would likely be 
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perceived as having resulted from the Council's custom* 
ary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, 
that its message was worthy of presentation and quite 
possibly of support as welL A newspaper, similarly, "is 
more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, 
comment, and advertising," and we have held that *[t]he 
choice of material • . . and the decisions made as to 
limitations on the size and content . . . and treatment 
of public issues . . .—whether fair or unfair—constitute 
the exercise of editorial control and judgment* upon 
which the State can not intrude, Tbrnillo, 418 U. S., at 
258. Indeed, in Pacific Gas & Electric, we invalidated 
coerced access to the envelope of a private utility's bill 
and newsletter because the utility "may be forced either 
to appear to agree with [the intruding leaflet] or to 
respond.11 475 U. S.t at 15 (plurality) (citation omitted). 
The plurality made the further point that if "the 
government [were] freely able to compel . . . speakers to 
propound political messages with which they disagree, 
. . . protection [of a speaker's freedom] would be empty, 
for the government could require speakers to affirm in 
one breath that which they deny in the nert.* / d , at 
16. Thus, when dissemination of a view contrary to 
one's own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected 
with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to 
autonomy over the message is compromised. 
In Turner Broadcasting, we found this problem absent 
in the cable context, because *[g]iven cable's long history 
of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there 
appears little risk that cable viewers would assume that 
the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey 
ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator." 512 
U. B.f at (slip op., at 31). We stressed that the 
viewer is frequently apprised of the identity of the 
broadcaster whose signal is being received via cable and 
that it is "common practice for broadcasters to disclaim 
any identity of viewpoint between the management and 
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the speakers who use the broadcast facility* Ibid, (slip 
op.f at 31) (citation omitted); see id., at (slip op.f at 
11) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (noting that Congress "might . • . conceivably 
obligate cable operators to act as common carriers for 
some of their channels"). 
Parades and demonstrations, in contrast, are not 
understood to be so neutrally presented or selectively 
viewed. Unlike the programming offered on various 
channels by a cable network, the parade does net consist 
of individual, unrelated segments that happen to be 
transmitted together for individual selection by members 
of the audience. Although each parade unit generally 
identifies itself, each is understood to contribute some-
thing to a common theme, and accordingly there is no 
customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow 
*any identity of viewpoint" between themselves and the 
selected participants. Practice follows practicability 
here, for such disclaimers would be quite curious in a 
moving parade. Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, 447 IL S. 74, 87 (1980) (owner of shopping mall 
"can expressly disavow any connection with the message 
by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers 
or handbillers stand"). Without deciding on the precise 
significance of the likelihood of misattribution, it 
nonetheless becomes clear that in the context of an 
expressive parade, as with a protest march, the parade's 
overall message is distilled from the individual presenta-
tions along die way, and each unit's expression is 
perceived by spectators as part of the whole. 
An additional distinction between Turner Broadcasting 
and this case points to the fundamental weakness of any 
attempt to justify the state court order's limitation on 
the Council's autonomy as a speaker. A cable is not 
only a conduit for speech produced by others and 
selected by cable operators for transmission, but a 
franchised channel giving monopolistic opportunity to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
94-749—OPINION 
20 HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY GROUP OP BOSTON 
shut out some speakers. This power gives rise to the 
government's interest in limiting monopolistic autonomy 
in order to allow for the survival of broadcasters who 
might otherwise be silenced and consequently destroyed. 
The government's interest in Turner Broadcasting was 
not the alteration of speech, but the survival of speak-
ers. In thus identifying an interest going beyond 
abridgment of speech itself, the defenders of the law at 
issue in Turner Broadcasting addressed the threshold 
requirement of any review under the Speech Clause, 
whatever the ultimate level of scrutiny, that a chal-
lenged restriction on speech serve a compelling! or at 
least important, governmental object, see, ej*., Pacific 
Gas & Electric, supra, at 19; Turner Broadcasting, 
supra, at (slip opM at 38); United States v. O'Brien, 
391 XL S. 367, 377 (1968). 
In this case, of course, there is no assertion compara-
ble to the Turner Broadcasting claim that some speakers 
will be destroyed in the absence of the challenged law. 
True, the size and success of petitioners' parade makes 
it an enviable vehicle for the dissemination of GLIB's 
views, but that fact, without more, would fall far short 
of supporting a claim that petitioners enjoy an abiding 
monopoly of access to spectators. See App. to Pet. for 
Cert. B9; Brief for Respondents 10 (citing trial court's 
finding that no other applicant has applied for the permit). 
Considering that GLIB presumably would have had a fair 
shot (under neutral criteria developed by the dty) at 
obtaining a parade permit of its own, respondents have 
not shown that petitioners ecjoy the capacity to "silence 
the voice of competing speakers," as cable operators do 
with respect to program providers who wish to reach 
subscribers, Turner Broadcasting, supra, at (slip op., 
at 32). Nor has any other legitimate interest been identi-
fied in support of applying the Massachusetts statute in 
this way to expressive activity like the parade. 
The statute, Mas6. Gen. Laws §272:98, is a piece of 
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protective legislation that announces no purpose beyond 
the object both expressed and apparent in its provisions, 
which is to prevent any denial of access to (or discrimi-
natory treatment in) public accommodations on pro-
scribed grounds, including sexual orientation. On its 
face, the object of the law is to ensure by statute for 
gays and lesbians desiring to make use of public 
accommodations what the old common law promised to 
any member of the public wanting a meal at the ion, 
that accepting the usual terms of service, they will not 
be turned away merely on the proprietor's exercise of 
personal preference. When the law is applied to 
expressive activity in the way it was done here, its 
apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify 
the content of their expression to whatever extent 
beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages 
of their own. But in the absence of some further, 
legitimate end, this object is merely to allow exactly 
what the general rule of speaker's autonomy forbids* 
It might, of course, have been argued that a broader 
objective is apparent: that the ultimate point of forbid-
ding acts of discrimination toward certain classes is to 
produce a society free of the corresponding biases. 
Requiring access to a speaker's message would thus be 
not an end in itself, but a means to produce speakers 
free of the biases, whose expressive conduct would be at 
least neutral toward the particular classes, obviating any 
future need for correction. But if this indeed is the 
point of applying the state law to expressive conduct, it 
is a decidedly frttal objective. Having availed itself of 
the public thoroughfares 'Tor purposes of assembly [and] 
communicating thoughts between citizens," the Council 
is engaged in a use of the streets that has "from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens.* Hague v. Committee fbr 
Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) 
(opinion of Roberts, J.). Our tradition of free speech 
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commands that a speaker who takes to the street corner 
to express his views in this way should be free from 
interference by the State based on the content of what 
he says. See, e.g.9 Police Department of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 408 U, S. 92, 95 (1972); ctL EL Kalveu, Jr., A 
Worthy Tradition 6-19 (1988); 0. Fiss, Free Speech and 
Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1408-1409 
(1986). The very idea that a noncommercial speech 
restriction be used to produce thoughts and statements 
acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates 
on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less 
than a proposal to limit speech in the service of ortho* 
dox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain 
antithesis. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U. S., at 642; Pacific 
Qa6 & Electric, 475 U. 8., at 20. While the law is free 
to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful 
behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no 
better reason than promoting an approved message or 
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened 
either purpose may strike the government. 
Far from supporting GLIB, then, Turner Broadcasting 
points to the reasons wby the present application of the 
Massachusetts law can not be sustained. So do the two 
other principal authorities GLIB has cited. In 
PruneYard, 447 U. S. 74, to be sure, we sustained a 
state law requiring the proprietors of shopping malls to 
allow visitors to solicit signatures on political petitions 
without a showing that the shopping mall owners would 
otherwise prevent the beneficiaries of the law from 
reaching an audience. But we found in that case that 
the proprietors were running "a business establishment 
that is open to the public to come and go as they 
please,* that the solicitations would "not likely be 
identified with those of the owner," and that the 
proprietors could "expressly disavow any connection with 
the message by simply posting signs in the area where 
the speakers or handbillers stand.11 JA, at 87. Also, in 
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Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, at 12, we noted that 
PruneYard did not involve "any concern that access to 
this area might affect the shopping center owner's 
exercise of his own right to speak: the owner did not 
even allege that he objected to the content of the 
pamphlets . . . ." The principle of speaker's autonomy 
was simply not threatened in that case. 
New York State Club Association is also instructive by 
the contrast it provides. There, we turned back a facial 
challenge to a state antidiscrimination statute on the 
assumption that the expressive associational character 
of a dining club with over 400 members could be 
sufficiently attenuated to permit application of the law 
even to such a private organization, but we also recog-
nized that the State did not prohibit exclusion of those 
whose views were at odds with positions espoused by the 
general club memberships. 487 U. S., at 13; see also 
Roberts, 468 U. S., at 627. In other words, although the 
association provided public benefits to which a State 
could ensure equal access, it was also engaged in 
expressive activity; compelled access to the benefit, 
which was upheld, did not trespass on the organization's 
message itself. If we were to analyze this case strictly 
along those lines, GLIB would lose. Assuming the 
parade to be large enough and a source of benefits 
(apart from its expression) that would generally justify 
a mandated access provision, GLIB could nonetheless be 
refused admission as an expressive contingent with its 
own message just as readily as a private club could 
exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds 
with a position taken by the club's existing members. 
IV 
Our holding today rests not on any particular view 
about the Council's message but on the Nation's commit-
ment to protect freedom of speech. Disapproval of a 
private speaker's statement does not legitimize use of 
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the Commonwealth's power to compel the speaker to 
alter the message by including one more acceptable to 
others. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme 
Judicial Court is reversed and the case remanded for 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
